[Introduction
to the catalogue of Making Things Public– Atmospheres
of Democracy, MIT Press 2005 (edited by Bruno Latour &
Peter Weibel]
"The
aide said that guys like me were ''in what we call the reality-based
community,'' which he defined as people who ''believe that solutions
emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.'' I
nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles
and empiricism. He cut me off. ''That's not the way the world
really works anymore,'' he continued. ''We're an empire now,
and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're
studying that reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act
again, creating other new realities, which you can study too,
and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors
. . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we
do.''
Some conjunctions of planets are
so ominous, astrologers used to say, that it seems safer to stay
at home in bed and wait until Heaven sends a more auspicious message.
It's probably the same with political conjunctions. They are presently
so hopeless that it seems prudent to stay as far away as possible
from anything political and to wait for the passing away of all
the present leaders, terrorists, commentators and buffoons who
strut about the public stage.
Astrology,
however, is as precarious an art as political science; behind
the nefarious conjunctions of hapless stars, other much dimmer
alignments might be worth pondering. With the political period
triggering such desperation, the time seems right to shift our
attention to other ways of considering public matters. And "matters"
are precisely what might be put center stage. Yes, public matters,
but how?
While
the German Reich has given us two world wars, the German language
has provided us with the word Realpolitik to describe a positive, materialist, no non sense, interest only, matter-of-fact
way of dealing with naked power relations. Although this "reality,"
at the time of Bismarck, might have appeared as a welcome change
after the cruel idealisms it aimed to replace, it strikes us now
as deeply unrealistic. In general, to invoke "realism"
when talking about politics is something one should not do without
trembling and shaking. The beautiful word "reality"
has been damned by the too many crimes committed in its name.
What is the
res of Respublica?
By
the German neologism Dingpolitik, we wish to designate a risky and tentative set of experiments in probing
just what it could mean for political thought to turn "things"
around and to become slightly more realistic than has been attempted up to now. A few years
ago, computer scientists invented the marvelous expression of
"object-oriented" software to describe a new way to
program their computers. We wish to use this metaphor to ask the
question: "What would an object-oriented democracy
look like?"
[Figure
1: Clinton's cat or the degree zero of politics: 'Socks'
Little Rock Arkansas 17-11-1992 AFP PHOTO MIKE NELSON.ok]
The
general hypothesis is so simple that it might sound trivial —but
being trivial might be part of what it is to become a "realist"
in politics. We might be more connected to each other by our worries,
our matters of concern, the issues we care for, than by any other
set of values, opinions, attitudes or principles. The experiment
is certainly easy to make. Just go in your head over any set of
contemporary issues: the entry of Turkey into the European Union,
the Islamic veil in France, the spread of genetically modified
organisms in Brazil, the pollution of the river near your home,
the breaking down of Greenland's glaciers, the diminishing return
of your pension funds, the closing of your daughter's factory,
the repairs to be made in your apartment, the rise and fall of
stock options, the latest beheading by fanatics in Falluja, the
latest American election. For every one of these objects, you
see spewing out of them a different set of passions, indignations,
opinions, as well as a different set of interested parties and
different ways of carrying out their partial resolution.
It's
clear that each object —each issue— generates a different
pattern of emotions and disruptions, of disagreements and agreements.
There might be no continuity, no coherence in our opinions, but
there is a hidden continuity and a hidden coherence in what we
are attached to. Each object gathers around itself a different
assembly of relevant parties. Each object triggers new occasions
to passionately differ and dispute. Each object may also offer
new ways of achieving closure without having to agree on much
else. In other words, matters in dispute — taken as so many
issues — bound all of us in ways that map out a public space
profoundly different from what is usually recognized under the
label of "the political." It is this space, this hidden
geography that we wish to explore through this catalogue and exhibition.
[Figure
2: Town's Hall Meetingok]
It's
not unfair to say that political philosophy has often been the
victim of a strong object-avoidance tendency. From Hobbes to Rawls,
from Rousseau to Habermas, many procedures have been devised to
assemble the relevant parties, to authorize them to contract,
to check their degree of representativity, to discover the ideal
speech conditions, to detect the legitimate closure, to write
the good constitution. But when it comes down to what is
at issue, namely the object of concern that brings them together,
not a word is uttered. In a strange way, political science is
mute just at the moment when the objects of concern should be
brought in and made to speak up loudly. Contrary to what the powerful
etymology of their most cherished word should imply, their Res-publica
does not seem to be loaded with too many things. Procedures
to authorize and legitimize are important, but it's only half
of what is needed to assemble. The other half lies in the issues
themselves, in the matters that matter, in the res that creates a public
around it. They need to be represented, authorized, legitimated
and brought to bear inside the relevant assembly.
What
we call an "object-oriented democracy" tries to redress
this bias in much of political philosophy, that is, to bring together
two different meanings of the word representation that have been kept separate in theory although they have remained always
mixed in practice. The first one, so well known in schools of
law and political science, designates the ways to gather the legitimate
people around some issue. In this case, a representation is said
to be faithful if the right procedures have been followed. The
second one, well known in science and in technology, presents
or rather represents what is the object of concern to the eyes and
ears of those who have been assembled around it. In this case,
a representation is said to be good if the matters at hand have
been accurately portrayed. Realism implies that the same degree
of attention be given to the two aspects of what it is to represent
an issue. The first question draws a sort of place, sometimes
a circle, which might be called an assembly, a gathering, a meeting,
a council; the second question brings into this newly created
locus a topic, a concern, an issue, a topos. But the two
have to be taken together: Who is to be concerned; What
is to be considered?
When
Thomas Hobbes instructed his engraver on how to sketch the famous
frontispiece for Leviathan, he had his mind full of optical
metaphors and illusion machines he had seen in his travels through
Europe. A third meaning of this ambiguous and ubiquitous
word "representation," the one with which artists are
most familiar, had to be called for to solve, this time visually,
the problem of the composition of the "Body Politik."
Up to now it has remained a puzzle: How to represent, and through
which medium, the sites where people meet to discuss their matters
of concern? It's precisely what we are tackling here. Shapin and Schaffer might have renewed Hobbes's
problem even more tellingly when they redrew his monster for their frontispiece and equipped his left arm not with the Bishop's crosier,
but with Boyle's air-pump. From now on, the powers of science are just
as important to consider: How do they assemble, and around which
matters of concern?
[Figure
3: Hobbes's Leviathan redrawn by Shapin and Schaffer ( )]
But
in addition to the visual puzzle of assembling composite bodies,
another puzzle should strike us in those engravings. A simple
look at them clearly proves that the "Body Politik"
is not only made of people! They are thick with things: clothes,
a huge sword, immense castles, large cultivated fields, crowns,
ships, cities and an immensely complex technology of gathering,
meeting, cohabiting, enlarging, reducing, and focusing. In addition
to the throng of little people summed up in the crowned head of
the Leviathan, there are objects everywhere.
[Figure
4: superposition on one page of the two walls of Lorenzetti, details
of cities and landscapes ( )]
To
be crowded with objects that nonetheless are not really integrated
into our definition of politics is even more tellingly visible
in the famous fresco painted by Lorenzetti in Siena's city hall. Many scholars have deciphered for us the complex
meaning of the emblems representing the Good and the Bad Government,
and have traced their complex genealogy. But what is most striking
for a contemporary eye is the massive presence of cities, landscapes,
animals, merchants, dancers, and the ubiquitous rendering of light
and space. The Bad Government is not simply illustrated by the
devilish figure of Discordia, but also through the dark light,
the destructed city, the ravaged landscape, and the suffocating
people. The Good Government is not simply personified by the various
emblems of Virtue and Concordia, but also through the transparency
of light, its well-kept architecture, its well-tended landscape,
its diversity of animals, the ease of its commercial relations,
its thriving arts. Far from being simply a décor for the
emblems, the fresco requests us to become attentive to a subtle
ecology of Good and Bad Government. And modern visitors, attuned
to the new issues of bad air, hazy lights, destroyed ecosystems,
ruined architecture, abandoned industry, and delocalized trades
are certainly ready to include in their definition of politics
a whole new ecology loaded with things. Where has political philosophy turned its distracted
gaze while so many objects were drawn under its very nose?
A new eloquence
In
this show, we simply want to pack loads of stuff into the empty
arenas where naked people were supposed to assemble simply to
talk. Two vignettes will help us focus on those newly crowded
sites.
The
first one is a fable proposed by Peter Sloterdijk. He imagined that the U.S. Air Force should
have added to its military paraphernalia an "inflatable Parliament"
which could be parachuted at the rear of the front, just after
the liberating forces of the Good had defeated the forces of Evil.
On hitting the ground, this parliament would unfold and be inflated
just like your rescue dingy is supposed to do when you fall in
the water. Ready to enter and take your seat, your finger still
red from the indelible ink that proves you have exerted your voting
duty, Instant Democracy would thus be delivered! The lesson of
this simile is easy to draw. To imagine a parliament without its
material set of complex instruments, "air-condition"
pumps, local ecological requirements, material infrastructure,
and long held habits is as ludicrous as to try to parachute such
an inflatable parliament into the middle of Iraq. By contrast,
probing an object-oriented democracy is to research what are the
material conditions that may render the air breathable again.
[Figure
5; Powell at ONU –if possible full page ok]
The
second vignette is the terrifying one offered by the now infamous
talk former Secretary of State Colin Powell gave to the United
Nations on February 5th, 2003 about the unambiguous
and undisputable fact of the presence of weapons of mass destructions
in Iraq. No doubt, the first half of the representation
—namely the assembly of legitimate speakers and listeners—
was well taken care of. All of those sitting around the UN Security
Council horse shoe table had a right to be there. But the same
can't be said of the second half, namely the representation of
the facts of the matter presented by the Secretary of State. Every
one of the slides was a blatant lie —and the more time has
passed the more blatant it has become. And yet their showing was
prefaced by these words: "My colleagues, every statement
I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These
are not assertions.
What we are giving you are facts and conclusions
based on solid intelligence" (my emphasis). Never has the
difference between facts and assertions been more abused than
on this day.
To
assemble is one thing; to represent to the eyes and ears of those
assembled what is at stake is another. An object-oriented democracy
should be concerned as much by the procedure to detect the relevant
parties as to the methods to bring into the center of the debate
the proof of what it is to be debated. This second set of procedures
to bring in the object of worry has several old names: eloquence,
or more pejoratively, rhetoric, or even more derogatory,
sophistry. And yet these are just the labels that we might
need to rescue from the dustbin of history. Mr. Powell tried to distinguish the rhetoric
of assertions from the undisputable power of facts. He failed
miserably. Having no truth, he had no eloquence either. Can we
do better? Can we trace again the frail conduits through which
truths and proofs are allowed to enter the sphere of politics?
Unwittingly,
the Secretary of State put us on a track where the abyss between
assertions and facts might be a nice "rhetorical" ploy,
but it has lost its relevance. It would imply, on the one hand,
that there would be matters-of-fact which some enlightened people
would have unmediated access to. On the other hand, disputable
assertions would be practically worthless, useful only insofar
as they could feed the subjective passions of interested crowds.
On one side would be the truth and no mediation, no room for discussion;
on the other side would be opinions, many obscure intermediaries,
perhaps some hecklings. Through the use of this indefatigable
cliché, the Inflatable Parliament is now equipped with
a huge screen on which thoroughly transparent facts are displayed.
Those who remain unconvinced prove by their resistance how irrational
they are; they have unfortunately fell prey to subjective passions.
And sure enough, having aligned so many "indisputable"
facts behind his position, since the "dispute" was still
going on, Powell had to close it arbitrarily by a show of unilateral
force. Facts and forces, in spite of so much vibrant declarations,
always walk in tandem.
The
problem is that transparent, unmediated, undisputable facts have
recently become rarer and rarer. To provide complete undisputable
proof has become a rather messy, pesky, risky business. And to
offer a public proof, big enough and certain enough to
convince the whole world of the presence of a phenomenon or of
a looming danger, seems now almost beyond reach —and always
was. The same American administration that was content
with a few blurry slides "proving" the presence of non-existing
weapons in Iraq is happy to put scare quotes around the proof
of much vaster, better validated, more imminent threats, such
as global climate change, diminishing oil reserves, increasing
inequality. Is it not time to say: "Mr. Powell, given what
you have done with facts, we would much prefer you to leave them
aside and let us instead compare mere assertions with one
another. Don't worry, even with such an inferior type of proof
we might nonetheless come to a conclusion and this one will not
be arbitrarily cut short."? Either we should despair of politics and abandon
the hope of providing public proofs altogether, or we should abandon
the much worn out cliché of incontrovertible matters of
fact. Could we do better, and manage to really conclude a dispute
with "disputable" assertions? After all, when Aristotle
—surely not a cultural relativist! — introduced the
word "rhetoric" it was precisely to mean proofs,
incomplete to be sure but proofs nonetheless.
This
is what we wish to attempt: where matters-of-facts have failed,
let's try what I have called matters-of-concern. What we are trying
to register here in this catalogue is a huge sea change in our
conceptions of science, our grasps of facts, our understanding
of objectivity. For too long, objects have been wrongly portrayed
as matters-of-fact. This is unfair to them, unfair to science,
unfair to objectivity, unfair to experience. They are much more
interesting, variegated, uncertain, complicated, far reaching,
heterogeneous, risky, historical, local, material, and networky
than the pathetic version offered for too long by philosophers.
Rocks are not simply there to be kicked at, desks to be thumped
at. "Facts are facts are facts"? Yes, but they are also
a lot of other things in addition.
For
those who, like Mr. Powell, have been used for ages to get rid
of all oppositions by claiming the superior power of facts, such
a sea change might be met with cries of derision: "relativism",
"subjectivism", "irrationalism", "mere
rhetoric", "sophistry"! They might see the new
life of facts as so much subtraction. Quite right! It subtracts
a lot of their power because it renders their life more difficult.
Think of that: they might have to enter into the new arenas for
good and finally make their point to the bitter end. They might
actually have to publicly prove their assertions against other
assertions, and come to a closure without thumping and kicking,
without alternating wildly between indisputable facts and indisputable
shows of terror. We wish to explore in this catalogue many other
realist gestures than just thumping and kicking. We want to imagine
a new eloquence. Is it asking too much from our
public conversation? It's great to be convinced, but it would
be even better to be convinced by some evidence.
Our
notions of politics have been thwarted for too long by an absurdly
unrealistic epistemology. Accurate facts are hard to come by and
the harder they are, the more they entail some costly equipment,
a longer set of mediations, more delicate proofs. Transparency
and immediacy are bad for science as well as for politics; they
would make both suffocate. What we need is to be able to bring inside
the assemblies divisive issues with their long retinue
of complicated proof-giving equipment. No unmediated access to agreement; no unmediated access to
the facts of the matter. After all, we are used to rather arcane
procedures for voting and electing. Why should we suddenly imagine
an eloquence so devoid of means, tools, tropes, tricks and knacks
that it would bring the facts in the arenas through some uniquely
magical transparent idiom? If politics is earthly, so is science.
From objects
to things
It's
to underline this shift from a cheapened notion of objectivity
to costly proofs that we want to resurrect the word "Ding"
and use the neologism Dingpolitik as a substitute for Realpolitik.
The latter lacks realism when it talks about power relations as
well as when it talks about mere facts. It does not know how to
deal with "indisputability." To discover one's own real
naked interest requires probably the most convoluted and farfetched
inquiry there is. To be brutal is not enough to turn you into
a hard-headed realist.
[Figure
6: Germanen beim Thing : school poster, probably made for the
"Museum fuer Vor- und Fruehgeschichte" by Martin
Harnoss (1906-1986) ok]
As
every reader of Heidegger knows, or as every glance at the English
dictionary under the heading "Thing" will certify, the
old word "Thing" or "Ding" designated originally
a certain type of archaic assembly. Many parliaments in Nordic and Saxon nations
still activate the old root of this etymology: Norwegian congressmen
assemble in the Storting; Icelandic deputies called the
equivalent of thingmen'
gather in the Althing; Isle of Man seniors used to gather around the
Ting; the German landscape is dotted with Thingstatten
and you can see in many places the circles of stones where the
Thing used to stand. Thus, long before designating an object thrown
out of the political sphere and standing there objectively and
independently, the Ding or Thing has for many centuries
meant the issue that brings people together because it
divides them. The same etymology lies dormant in the Latin res,
the Greek aitia, and the French or Italian cause. Even the Russian soviet still dreams of
bridges and churches.
Of
all the eroded meanings left by the slow crawling of political
geology, none is stranger to consider than the Icelandic Althing
since the ancient "thingmen" —what we would call
"congressmen" or MPs— had the amazing idea of
meeting in a desolate and sublime site which happens to sit smack
in the middle of the fault line that marks the meeting place of
the Atlantic and European tectonic plates. Not only Icelanders
manage to remind us of the old sense of Ding, but they
also dramatize to the utmost how much these political questions
have also become questions of nature. Are not all parliaments
now divided by the nature of things as well as by the din of the
crowded Ding? Has the time not come to bring the res back
to the Respublica? This is the reason why we have tried to build
the provisional and fragile assembly of our show on as many fault
lines from as many tectonic plates as possible.
[Figure
7: Iceland Althing: Sabine Himmelbach photo ok]
The
point of reviving this old etymology is that we don't assemble
because we agree, look alike, feel good, are socially compatible,
wish to fuse together, but because we are brought by divisive
matters of concern into some neutral, isolated place in order
to come to some sort of provisional makeshift (dis)agreement.
If the Ding designates both those who assemble because
they are concerned as well as what causes their concerns and divisions,
it should become the center of our attention: Back to Things!
Is this not a more engaging political slogan?
But
how strange is the shape of the things we should go back to. They
no longer have the clarity, transparency, obviousness of matters-of-facts;
they are not made of clearly delineated, discrete objects that
would be bathing into some translucent space like the beautiful
anatomical drawings of Leonardo, or the marvelous wash drawings
of Gaspard Monge, or the clear cut isotypes devised by Otto Neurath. Matters-of-fact now appear to our eyes as depending
on a delicate aesthetic of painting, drawing, lighting, gazing,
convening, something that has been elaborated over four centuries
and that might be changing now under our very eyes. There has been an aesthetic of matters-of-fact,
of objects, of Gegenstand. Can we devise an aesthetic of
matters-of-concern, of Things? This is one of the (too many!)
topics we wish to explore.
Gatherings
is the translation that Heidegger used to talk about those Things,
those sites able to assemble mortals and gods, humans and non-humans.
There is more than a little irony in extending this meaning to
what Heidegger and his followers loved to hate, namely science,
technology, commerce, industry, and popular culture. And yet this is just what we intend to do in
this book: the objects of science and technology, the aisles of
supermarkets, financial institutions, medical establishments,
computer networks —even the cat walk of fashion shows!— offer paramount examples of hybrid forums and
agoras, of the gatherings that have been eating away at the older
realm of pure objects bathing in the clear light of the modernist
gaze. Who could dream of a better example of hybrid forums than
the scale models used by architects all over the world to assemble
those able to build them at scale one? Or the thin felt pen used by draughtsman to
imagine new ladnscapes? When we say "Public matters!" or
"Back to Things!" we are not trying to go back to the
old materialism of Realpolitik, because matter itself
is up for grabs as well. To be materialist now implies that
one enters a labyrinth more intricate than that built by Daedalus.
[Figure
8 and 9: Shuttle Columbia's halls okay]
In
the same fatal month of February 2003, another stunning example
of this shift from object to things was demonstrated by the explosion
of the shuttle Columbia. "Assembly drawing" is
how engineers call the invention of the blueprint. But the word assembly sounds odd once the shuttle
has exploded and its debris has been gathered in a huge hall where
inquirers from a specially designed commission are trying to discover
what happened to the shuttle. They are now provided with an "exploded
view" of a highly complex technical object. But what has
exploded is our capacity to understand what objects are when they
have become Ding. How sad that we need catastrophes to
remind us that when Columbia was shown on its launching
pad in its complete, autonomous, objective form that such a view
was even more of a lie than Mr. Powell's presentation of the "facts"
of WMD. It's only after the explosion that everyone realized
the shuttle's complex technology should have been drawn with the
NASA bureaucracy inside of it in which they too would have
to fly.
The
object, the Gegenstand, may remain outside of all assemblies,
but not the Ding. Hence the question we wish to raise: What are
the various shapes of the assemblies that can make sense
of all those assemblages? Questions we address to the three
types of representation brought together in this show: political,
scientific, and artistic.
Through
some amazing quirk of etymology, it just happens that the same
root has given birth to those twin brothers: the Demon
and the Demos —and those two are more at war with
one another than Eteocles and Polyneices have ever been. The word "demos" that makes half
of the much vaunted word "demo-cracy" is haunted by
the demon, yes the devil, because they share the same Indo-European
root da- to divide. If the demon is such a terrible threat, it's
because it divides in two. If the demos is such a welcome solution,
it's because it also divides in two. A paradox? No, it's because
we ourselves are so divided by so many contradictory attachments
that we have to assemble.
We
might be familiar with Jesus's admonition against Satan's power, but the same power of division is also what
provides the division/divide, namely the sharing of the
same territory. Hence the people, the demos, are
made up of those who share the same space and are divided
by the same contradictory worries. How could an object-oriented
democracy ignore such a vertiginous uncertainty? When the knife
hovers around the cake of common wealth to be divided in shares,
it may divide and let the demon of civil strife loose,
or it may cut equal shares and let the demos happily apportioned.
Strangely enough, we are divided and yet might have to divide,
that is to share, even more. The "demos" is haunted
by the demon of division! No wonder that this show offers, I am
afraid, such a pandemonium. Politics is a branch of teratology: from Leviathan to devils, from Discordia
to Behemoth, and soon a whole array of ghosts and phantoms. Tricks
and treats
all the way down.
No representation
without representations
Michael
Frayn's play Democracy begins with the grating noise of a worm, a little annelid that at the
onset is supposed to make the whole decadent West crumble like
a wooden house eaten up by termites while the sturdy and united
DDR emerges from chaos. The same noisy worm is heard again at the end
of the play, but this time it's the whole Soviet Bloc that, unexpectedly,
lies in dust while democracy — "the worst form of government,
except for all the others," as Churchill famously
said — keeps on munching and worming along.
A demon haunts politics but it might not
be so much the demon of division —this is what is so devilish
about it— but the demon of unity, totality, transparency,
and immediacy. "Down with intermediaries! Enough spin! We
are lied to! We have been betrayed." Those cries resonate
everywhere and everyone seems to sigh: "Why are we being
so badly represented?" Columnists, educators, militants never
tire of complaining of a "crisis of representation."
They claim that the masses seem no longer to feel at ease with
what its elites are telling them. Politicians, they say, have
become aloof, unreal, surrealistic, virtual, and alien. An abysmal
gap has opened between the "political sphere" and the
"reality that people have to put up with." If this gap
is yawning under our feet much like the Icelandic fault line,
surely no Dingpolitik can ignore it.
But
it might also be the case that half of such a crisis is due to
what has been sold to the general public under the name of a faithful,
transparent and accurate representation. We are asking from representation something
it cannot possibly give, namely representation without any re-presentation,
without any provisional assertions, without any imperfect proof,
without any opaque layers of translations, transmissions, betrayals,
without any complicated machinery of assembly, delegation, proof,
argumentation, negotiation, and conclusion.
In
2002 in the course of another exhibition called "Iconoclash",
many of the same authors have tried to explore the roots of a
specific form of Western fanaticism. If only there was no image
—that is, no mediation— the better our grasp of Beauty,
Truth and Piety would be. We visited the famous iconoclastic periods
from the Byzantine to the Reformation, from Lenin's Red Square
to Malevich's Black Square, to which we added the less well-known struggles among iconoclasts and
iconodules in mathematics, physics and the other sciences. We wanted to compare with one another the various
interference patterns created by all those forms of contradictory
attitudes toward images. Scientists, artists, and clerks have
been multiplying imageries, intermediaries, mediations, representations
while tearing them down and resurrecting them with even more forceful,
beautiful, inspired, objective forms. We reckoned that it was
not absurd to explore the whole Western tradition by following
up such a ubiquitous double bind. Hence the neologism Iconoclash to point at this ambivalence, this
other demonic division: "Alas, we cannot do anything without
image!" "Fortunately, we cannot do anything without
image!"
[Figure
10: "Moyens expéditifs du peuple franais pour démeubler
un aristocrate" Révolutions de France et de Brabant,
illustrations 52 Anonyme, the Hougton Library, Harvard University
okay]
Iconoclash
was not an iconoclastic show, but a show about iconoclasm;
not a critical show but a show about critique. The urge
to debunk was no longer a resource to feed from, we hoped,
but a topic to be carefully examined. Like the slave who
was asked to remind emperors during their triumphs that they were
mere mortals, we had asked an angel to come down and suspend in
mid-air the arm that held the hammer, an angel that could mutter
in the ear of the triumphant idol-breakers: "Beware! Consider
what you strike at with so much glee. Look first at what you might
risk destroying instead!" Once the destructive gesture
was suspended, we discovered that no iconoclast had ever struck
at the right target. Their blows always drifted sideways. For
this reason, even Saint George, we thought, looked more interesting
without his spear.
[Figure
11: St Georges San Giorgio Maggiore, Venice, photo Fondazione
Cini okay]
Our
aim was to move the collective attention, as the subtitle of the
show, "beyond the image wars in science, religion
and art," clearly indicated. This "beyond" was
drawn, very simply, by taking into consideration the other half
of what they were all doing: those we were following were never
simply tearing down idols, burning fetishes, debunking ideologies,
exposing scandals, breaking down old forms but also putting
ideas onto pedestals, invoking deities, proving facts, establishing
theories, building institutions, creating new forms, and also destroying unexpectedly and unwittingly other things they did not know
that they cherished so much. By bringing destruction, blunder,
plunder, and construction together we hoped to foster a new respect
for mediators.
Obviously,
there is something in the way flows of images create access to
Beauty, Truth and Piety that has been missed by idol-breakers
over the ages. To summarize our attempt in one simile, I proposed
to say that Moses, in addition to being tongue-twisted, might
have also been a little hard of hearing and that's why he had
understood "Thou shall not make unto thee any graven image"
when he had been told: "Thou shall not freeze frame."
If you stick to them, images are dangerous, blasphemous, idolatrous;
but they are safe, innocent, indispensable if you learn how to
jump from one image to the next. "Truth is image, but there
is no image of Truth." This solution might offer, we thought, a possible
cure against fundamentalism, that is, the belief that without
any representation you would be represented even better.
Iconoclash,
however, carefully excluded politics. This was done on purpose.
There is no activity where it is more difficult to pay due respect
to mediators; no calling more despised than that of politicians;
no sphere more inviting for irony, satire, debunking, derision
than the political sphere; no idols more inviting for destructions
than the Idols of the Forum; no discourse easier to deconstruct.
On political rhetoric, critique has a field day. By kindergarten,
toddlers have already grown cynical on all political matters.
In a show that was about critique, adding politics would
have skewed the whole project and visitors would have left even
more iconoclast than when they had entered.
But
once we have moved beyond the image wars, once we have
regained a good grasp of the masses of intermediaries necessary
to represent anything, once we have moved back to things, could
we extend the same attention for mediators to the most despised
activity, namely political spin? Is it possible now to tackle the question of political representation
with care and respect? Even more extravagant: Is it possible to
tackle it uncritically? Just try to imagine a
show about politics that would not be about debunking, exposing,
revealing, or smashing the idols down. Do you really want to take
politics positively? Indeed.
"Disabled
persons of all nations, unite!"
What
makes it so difficult to stare straight at the Gorgonian face
of politics, is that we seem to delight in adding to it some even
more distorting traits. Not happy with Frankenstein, we want to
hybridize it with Quasimodo. Monstrous it is, yet this is not
a reason to transform it into a painting by Hieronymus Bosch.
Or rather, Bosch is painting our own internal Hell which might
not bear that much of a relation with the specific monsters of politics. What frightens us so much in collective action,
the reason why we delight so much in despising it, is that we
might see reflected in its distorted mirror our own grimacing
faces. Are we not asking from the assembly something it cannot
possibly deliver, so that talking positively of politics horrifies
us because it's our limitations that we are not prepared to accept?
If it's true that representations are so indispensable and yet
so opaque, how well prepared are we to handle them? When hearing
the call for assembling at the Thing, are we able to accept that
we are radically and basically unfit to take a seat in it? Do
we have the cognitive equipment required for this? Are we not,
on the whole, totally handicapped?
[Figure
12: Norman Rockwell, Freedom of Speech: preparatory painting okay]
Instead of the radiant citizen standing
up and speaking his mind by using his solid common sense, as in
Rockwell's famous painting "Freedom of speech", should
we not look for an eloquence much more indirect, distorted, inconclusive?
In this show, we want to tackle the question of politics from
the point of view of our own weaknesses instead of projecting
them first onto the politicians themselves. We could say that
the blind lead the blind, the deaf speak eloquently to the deaf,
the crippled are leading marches of dwarfs, or rather, to avoid
those biased words, let's say that we are all politically-challenged.
How would it look if we were chanting this more radical and
surely more realistic slogan: "Handicapped of all nations,
unite!"? After all, was not Demosthenes, as much as
Moses and many other legislators, speech-impaired? Are we not all when our time comes to speak
up?
The
cognitive deficiency of participants has been hidden for a long
time because of the mental architecture of the dome in which the
Body Politik was supposed to assemble. We were told that all of
us — upon entering this dome, this public sphere —
had to leave aside in the cloak room our own attachments, passions
and weaknesses. Taking our seat under the transparent crystal
of the common good, through the action of some mysterious machinery,
we would then be collectively endowed with more acute vision
and higher virtue. At least that was the idea, no matter if the
machinery was the social contract or some other metamorphosis:
the selfish narrow-minded worm will re-emerge as a brightly colored
collective butterfly.
During
the Enlightenment, architects took this virtual reality so literally
that they actually drew and sometimes built those domes, globes
and palaces. Later, during the time of revolutions, other
builders gave a shape to this public sphere that was no longer
limited to deputies and congressmen, but included the whole people
or the proletariat or the volk. They distributed speech differently, they imagined
another way to compose the body, the procedures were modified,
they arrayed much vaster masses, but it was still under a dome
that they marched and chanted. From Boullée to Speer, from
Pierre-Charles L'Enfant to the new Scottish parliament, from John
Soane to Norman Foster, it seemed possible for architects to provide
a literal rendition of what it means to assemble in order to produce
the common will. Individuals might be corrupted, feeble, deficient,
but above their weak heads there was a heaven, a sphere, a globe
under which they all sat. Just before the French Revolution, Emmanuel-Joseph
Sieyes imagined a parliament so big —and so virtual—
that it extended to the whole of France, tiers after tiers, all
the way to the furthest provinces.
[Figure
13: The German Berlin Reichstag or one of the pictures of revolutionary
projects depending on Heurtin and Schwarte ( )]
Unfortunately,
much like the Tower of Babel, those "palaces of reason"
—to use the name of many city halls in northern Italy—
are no longer able to house the issues they were supposed to gather.
Commentators of the "events" of May 1968 in France were
amused to see that the turbulent demonstrating crowds passed by
the National Assembly without even looking at it, as if its irrelevance
was so great that it could not even invite abuses. How irrelevant
they might seem now that the global has become the new name of
the Body PolitiK. Where would you assemble the global?
Certainly not under golden domes and kitsch frescoes where heroic
senators and half naked Republics are crowned by laurels descending
from clouds. Why are politics always about imitation? There is
Robespierre imitating Cicero, Lenin mimicking Robespierre. In
the name of the common good, forests of Greek columns have been
erected across the Western world —while the "mother
of all parliaments" in Westminster remained faithful to the
dark, cramped, uncomfortable cave of stalls, spires and gargoyles.
Neo-gothic, neo-classic, neo-modern or neo-postmodern, those spaces
were all "neo", that is, trying to imitate some venerated
past. But you might need more than imitation to build
the new political assemblies. Covering the Reichstag with a transparent
dome —in effect fully opaque— as Foster did, doesn't
seem nearly enough to absorb the new masses that are entering
political arenas. If it's true that a parliament is a complex
machinery of speech, of hearing, of voting, of dealing, what should
be the shapes adjusted to a Dingpolitik? What would a political
space be that would not be "neo"? What would a truly
contemporary style of assembly look like?
It's
impossible to answer this question without gathering techniques
of representation in different types of assemblies. The effect
we wish to obtain is to show that parliaments are only a few machineries
of representations among many others and not necessarily the most
relevant or the best equipped.
It's
likely that fundamentalists will not like our show: they think
they are safer without representation. They really believe that
outside of any assembly, freed from all those cumbersome, tortuous
and opaque techniques, they will see better, farther, faster and
act more decisively. Inspired directly by the Good, often by their
God, they despise the indirectness of representations. But realists
might appreciate it because if we are all politically-challenged,
if there is no direct access to the general will, if no transparent
dome gives any global visibility, if, at best, blind lead blind,
then any small, even infinitesimal innovation in the practical
ways to represent an issue will make a small, that is, huge difference.
Not for the fundamentalist, but for the realists.
Ask
the blind what difference it makes to have a white cane or not.
Ask the deaf what difference it makes to be instrumented with
a hearing-aid or not. Ask the crippled, the advantage they see
in having a slightly better adjusted wheelchair. If we are all
handicapped, or rather politically-challenged, we need many different
prostheses. Each object exhibited in the show and commented in
the catalogue is such a crutch. We promise nothing more grandiose
than a store of aids for the invalids who have been repatriated
from the political frontlines —and haven't we all been badly
mauled in recent years? Politics might be better taken as a branch
of disability studies.
From an Assembly
of Assemblies...
An
exhibition cannot do much, but it can explore new possibilities
with a much greater degree of freedom because it is so good at
thought-experiments, or rather Gedankenaustellung. One of those attempts is to design not one assembly but rather an assembly
of assemblies, so that, much like in a fair, visitors or readers
can compare the different types of representation.
This is what we have attempted here.
Scientific
laboratories, technical institutions, marketplaces, churches and
temples, financial trading rooms, internet forums, ecological
disputes — without forgetting the very shape of the museum
inside which we gather all those membra disjecta —
are just some of the forums and agoras in which we speak, vote,
decide, are decided upon, prove, are being convinced. Each has
its own architecture, its own technology of speech, its complex
set of procedures, its definition of freedom and domination, its
ways to bring together those who are concerned —and even
more important those who are not concerned — and what concerns
them, its expedient way to obtain closure and come to a decision.
Why not render them comparable to one another?
After
all, they have never stopped exchanging their properties: churches
became temples before becoming city halls; heads of state learned from artists how to
create through publicity a public space; it is deep inside convents that the complex
voting procedures have been prepared and constitutions been written; while laboratories are migrating to forums,
the tasting of products borrows heavily from laboratory; supermarkets are taking more and more features
that make them look like contested voting booths; but even the most abstruse models of physics
have to borrow heavily from social theories. On the other hand, financial institutions seem
to gather more information technologies than parliaments. The quietest sites of nature have become some
of the most contested and disputed battlegrounds. As for the World Wide Web, it begins by being
a mess and slowly imports all sorts of virtual architectures but
only very few reproduce the even more virtual space of the original
parliaments; artistic installations borrow more and more
from scientific demonstrations; technical know how absorbs more and more elements
from law. There is no river that flows anymore from mountain
to sea without being as equipped in speech making instruments
as humans are through opinion polls. Such is the constant commerce, the ceaseless
swapping, the endless crisscrossing of apparatuses, procedures,
instruments and customs that we have attempted to weave through
this show and this catalogue.
[Figure
14: The scientific congress Pasteur in 1882]
To
collect such an assembly of assemblies, we have not tried to build
around them an even bigger, a more all-encompassing dome. We have
not tried to imagine that they would all be reducible to the European
tradition of Parliaments. On the contrary, we have offered to
show how much they differ from one another by linking them through
the humble and mundane back door of their representation machineries.
We would like visitors and readers to move from one to the other
by asking every time the three following questions: How do they
manage to bring in the relevant parties? How do they manage to
bring in the relevant issues? What change does it make in the
way people make up their mind to be attached to things?
We
hope that once this assembly of assemblies is deployed, that which
passes for the political sphere, namely the parliaments and the
offices of the executive branches, will appear as one type among
many others, perhaps even a rather ill-equipped type. This approach
to presenting the representation technology of parliamentary life
will not seek to ridicule its antiquated ways nor to criticize
the European way of imagining public space. On the contrary, in
the object-oriented conception, "parliament" is a technical
term for "making things public" among many other forms
of producing voices and connections among people. By this comparative
visit, we seek to learn how parliaments —with a small p—
could be enlarged or connected or modified or redrawn. Instead of saying that "everything is
political" by detecting dark forces hidden beneath all the
other assemblages, we wish on the contrary to locate the tiny
procedures of parliamentary assent and dissent, in order to see
on what practical terms and through which added labor they
could, one day, become pertinent. In this show, we hope
visitors to shop for the materials that might be needed later
for them to build this new Noah's Ark: the Parliament of Things.
Don't you hear the rain pouring relentlessly already? And Noah
for sure was a realist.
... to an Assembly
of Dissembling
There
might just be another reason than the weak imagination of architects
for not having a well-designed dome under which to assemble: getting
together might not be such a universal desire after all! No matter
how wide you stretch it, the political horizon might be too small
to encompass the whole Earth. Not only because parliaments are
too tiny, not only because a parliament of parliaments would require
the use of many different machineries now dispersed among different
gatherings, but because the very idea of a political assembly
might not be shareable in the end. The urge for political representation
might be so much of a Western obsession that other people might
object to being thus mobilized or called
for. And this objection too has to be registered in our show.
If
you read the UNESCO literature, it seems that the whole world
aspires to become one under the aegis of democracy, transparent
representation, and the rule of law. But what if every time this
inflatable parliament was being dropped in, many other voices
were raised: "No Politics Please!", "No representation!",
"Not with you", "No democracy, thanks", "Would
you please stay as far away as possible", "Leave us
alone", "I'd rather not", "I prefer my king?". What if the disagreements were not the sort
of issues that divide people in the normal state of things, but
were bearing instead on the very way to assemble at all? What
if we had to imagine not an assembly of assemblies, not even an
assembly of ways of assembling, but an assembly of ways of dissembling?
Would not that be a call for disassembling instead?
And
yet this is just what happens when you begin to listen to other
voices. Not because they are exotic, far fetched, archaic, irrational,
but because they too claim that making things public might be
a much more protracted affair than entering into the realm of
politics —even widely enlarged. Under the thin veneer of
"democracy for all" will soon appear another crisis
of representation, one much wider and deeper because it will strike
at the heart of what it is to represent at all.
Listen
to the Japanese tradition: the very word representation strikes
their ears as quaint and superficial. Listen to the Jivaros: their highly complex
rhetoric of agonistic encounters aim at not meeting in
the same assembly. Listen to the Jihadists calling for the extension
of the Oumma. The word "demokrata" remains an imported
vocabulary that resonates more like a term of abuse than any deeply
cherished value. There are many other ways to assemble than
under the aegis of a political intent. And when highlanders of New Guinea assemble
to vote using a complex procedure imported by helicopter from
Australian-trained scrutinizers, can we measure how much they
have transformed it? Even in our own lands obsessed by the transparent
republic, much effort is put into doing just the opposite, that
is, in making things secret. What if one of the causes of fundamentalism
was that all those other ways of gathering find themselves, in
the end, badly represented? As if the usual garment of politics
was too narrow for them? As if they never had room to assemble
with the other things they are attached to, such as their gods,
their divinities, their scruples of conscience. It's as if the
whole definition of politics inherited from the conflicts between
church and state had to be discussed again.
To
see politics as a problem of collecting, where if you don't manage
it properly you disappear into chaos, seems to be the problem
of only a fraction of humanity, i.e. those obsessed by the link
between their cosmic and social order. And even among those, the idea of politics
as speaking one's mind in the middle of an assembly seems to be
a rather provincial notion. According to Franois Jullien, the
Chinese tradition seems to ignore it entirely. The Chinese, at least in their ancient learned
tradition, don't want simply to add their differences to other
differences. They are more than happy to take their seats in the
global amphitheatre of multiculturalism —similarly seated
but with a tiny difference of angle to witness the same
spectacle— but wish to remain indifferent
to our own, meaning Western, ways of being all encompassing. Differences
we could absorb —we thought we could absorb under the decaying
but still solid dome of the Holy Roman Empire— but indifferences?
To
the possible dismay of political scientists, the very idea of
a political assembly does not gather much interest. This is where
things become really complicated and thus interesting: How to
devise an assembly of ways of dissembling instead of sending
a convocation to gather under the common dome of "One Politics
Size Fits All"? Can we enlarge our definition of politics
to the point where it accepts its own suspension? But who can
really be that open-minded?
And
yet, do we have another course of action? It would be too easy
simply to recognize the many contradictions as if we could be
content with the absence or the demise of all political assemblies.
As if we could abandon for good the task of composition. There
must be some alternative to cheap universalism ("but surely
every human is a political animal") and to cheap relativism
("let everyone gather under one's own flag, and if they have
no flag then let them hang themselves!").
That
we have to find a way out is forced upon us by what is called
"globalization": even though the Jivaros, the Chinese,
the Japanese, the faithful members of the Oumma, the born-again
Christians, etc. don't want to enter under the same dome, they
are still, willingly or unwillingly, connected by the very expansion
of those make shift assemblies we call markets, technologies,
science, ecological crises, wars and terrorist networks. In other
words, the many differing assemblages we have gathered under the
roof of ZKM are already connecting people no matter how
much they don't feel assembled by any common politics.
The shape of the dome might be contested, because it does not
allow enough room for differences and indifferences, but that
there is something at work that is called "global" is
not in question. It's simply that our usual definitions of politics
have not caught up yet with the masses of linkages already established.
[Figure
15: Mercator's frontispiece, 1609, BL personal collection okay]
In
this catalogue we want to probe further into this historical paradox.
In earlier times, say during the Enlightenment, there existed
a metaphysical globe to use Sloterdijk's expression, even though globalization was barely beginning.
But now that we are indeed globalized, there is no globe anymore!
To take an example, when the cartographer Mercator transformed
Atlas from a distorted giant supporting the Earth on his shoulder
into a quiet and seated scientist holding the planet in his hand,
this was probably the time when globalization was at its zenith.
And yet the world in 1608 was barely known and people remained
far apart. Still, every new land, every new civilization, every
new difference could be located, situated, housed, without much
surprise into the transparent house of Nature. But now that the
world is known, people are brought together by violent deeds,
even if they wish to differ and not be connected. There is no
global anymore to assemble them. The best proof is that there
are people setting up demonstrations against globalization. The
global is up for grabs. Globalization is simultaneously at its
maximum and the globe at its nadir. There are lots of blogs
but no globe.
And
yet, we are all in the same boat, or at least the same flotilla.
To use Neurath's metaphor, the question is how to rebuild it while
we are cruising on it? Or rather, how can we make it navigate
when it's made of a fleet of diverging but already intertwined
barges? In other words, can we overcome the multiplicity of ways
of assembling and dissembling, and yet raise the question of the
one common world? Can we make an assembly out of all the
various assemblages in which we are already enmeshed?
The Phantom
Public
The
cry is well known: "The Great Pan is dead!" Nature,
this huge and silent parliament where all the creatures would
be arrayed tier after tier from the biggest to the smallest, this
magnificent amphitheatre offering to the clumsy politicians a
perfect and successful original of what is rational and what is
irrational, this great parliament of nature has crumbled down
much like the Tower of Babel. Political philosophy has always tried to prop
up its frail intuitions onto the solid and powerful pattern of
some other science: it seems everything from the metaphor of the
organism to that of the brain has been tried. It has been a continuous
undertaking: How to replace the dangerous trade of politics by
the serious and safe knowledge of some better established science?
And it has continuously failed.
A
crisscrossing of metaphors from Menenius's "Fable of the
Member and the Stomach" to contemporary socio-biology and cybernetics, has tried to fasten the poor assemblies of
humans to the solid reality of nature. All the organs of the body
have been tried out to probe the making up of the monstrous Body
Politik. All the animals have been invoked in turn:
ants, bees, sheep, wolves, bugs, worms, pigs, chimps, baboons,
etc. to establish a firmer ground for the whimsical assemblies
of humans. And yet to no avail, since they are many ways to be
a body, since sheep don't flock, wolves are not as cruel as humans, baboons have an intense social life, brains have no central direction. It seems that nature is no longer unified enough
to provide a stabilizing pattern for the traumatic experience
of humans living in society. No doubt, the Body Politik is a monster
—so much so that it's not even a body.
But
which type of monster is it? This is what we wish to find
out. We might have transformed politics into a monstrous activity
because we have tried to make it exist in a form, borrowed from
nature, which it could not possibly take. "The answer was
not acceptable in the 19th century, when men, in spite
of all their iconoclasm, were still haunted by the phantom of
identity," wrote Walter Lippmann in a stunning book called
the Phantom Public. In many ways our exhibition is an effort in
teratology, an experiment in trying to pry apart two ghostly figures:
the Leviathan and the Phantom of the Public. (Sorry there is no
way to talk about politics and to speak of beautiful shapes, elegant
silhouettes, heroic statues, glorious ideals, radiant futures,
transparent information —except if you want to go through,
once again, the long list of grandiose ceremonies held by various
totalitarianisms which, as we are all painfully aware, lead to
the worst abominations. The choice is either to speak of monsters
early on with care and caution, or too late and end up as a criminal.
O Machiavelli, how right you were, let us pray that we heed your
cautious lessons in realism.)
According
to Lippmann and to the philosopher John Dewey in response to his
book, most of European political philosophy has been
obsessed by the body and the state. They have tried to assemble
an impossible parliament that represented really the contradictory
wills of the multitude into one General Will. But this
enterprise suffered from a cruel lack of realism. Representation,
conceived in that total, complete and transparent fashion, cannot
possibly be faithful. By asking from politics something it could
not deliver, Europeans kept generating aborted monsters and ended
up discouraging people to think politically. For politics to be
able to absorb more diversity ("the Great Society" in
Dewey's time and what we now call "Globalization"),
it has to devise a very specific and new type of representation.
Lippmann calls it a Phantom because it's disappointing for those
who dream of unity and totality. Yet strangely enough, it is a
good ghost, the only spirit that could protect us against
the dangers of fundamentalism. Long before the United States degenerated
into its present conservative revolution, it had a much more sturdy
and contemporary tradition. Those American philosophers call their
tradition pragmatism, meaning by this word not the cheap
realism often associated with being "pragmatic," but
the costly realism requested by making politics turn toward pragmata
—the Greek name for Things. Now that's realism!
In
this exhibition, we try the impossible feat to give flesh
to the Phantom of the Public. We want to make the visitors feel
the difference there is between expecting from the Body Politik
something it cannot give —and that surely creates a monster—
and being moved by the Phantom Public. The idea is to take the
word Phantom and to grant this fragile and provisional concept
more reality —at least more realism— than the phantasmagorical
spheres, globes, common good and general will that the Leviathan
was supposed to incarnate. In other words, the problem of composing
one body from the multitude of bodies — a problem that is
reviewed here by many exhibits— we want to tackle it again,
but this time with contemporary means and media.
The
Phantom designed by Michel Jaffrenou and Thierry Coduys is an
invisible work of art. It's activated by the movements of the
visitors throughout the show so that each spectator is simultaneously
an actor in the show and the only screen on which the whole spectacle
is projected. By moving through the various exhibits, the visitors
will trigger various captors that will be used as so many inputs
to trigger outputs which will give a vague and uneasy feeling
that "something happens" of which the bystanders are
responsible but in a way that is not directly traceable. Politics
will pass through you as a rather mysterious flow just like a
phantom. Moreover, the input/output relation will vary according
to the time of day, the number of people in the show, the answers
given to the various queries, the cumulative effect of past visitors,
the somewhat invisible presence of the web visitors. At times
the relation will be traceable in a sort of one-to-one connection
("I did this and here is what happens"), but at other
instances the whole effect will be entirely lost ("I did
nothing and here is what happened"), while at some other
times the effect will be direct but on some other visitors. Through
this complex, invisible (and expensive!) work of art rendered
possible by the complex technology infrastructure of ZKM, we hope to substitute in the mind of the visitor
the light spirit of the Phantom to the crushing weight of the
total Body Politik. Unfortunately, the catalogue has to render
through the lay out the experience of what it is to be caught
by the passage of this Phantom Public. It's to the flow of words
and images that we have to confide the task of imitating the ghostly
but spirited figure of politics.
Why
do we attach so much importance to the difference between Body
Politik and Phantom? It is due to the fact that for the new eloquence
to become a habit of thought, we must be able to distinguish two
ways of speaking. To raise a political question often means
to reveal a state of affairs whose presence was hitherto hidden.
But then you risk falling into the same trap of providing social
explanations and do exactly the opposite of what is meant here
by political flow. You use the same old repertoire of already
gathered social ties to "explain" the new associations.
Although you seem to speak about politics you don't speak
politically. What you are doing is simply the extension
one step further of the same small repertoire of already standardized
forces. You might feel the pleasure of providing a "powerful
explanation," but that's just the problem: you yourself partake
in the expansion of power, not the re-composition of its
content. Even though it resembles political talks, it has not
even begun to address the political endeavor since it has not
tried to assemble the candidates into a new assembly adjusted
to their specific requirements. "Drunk with power" is
an expression not only fit for generals, presidents, CEOs, mad
scientists and bosses — it can also be used for those commentators
who are confusing the expansion of powerful explanations with
the composition of the collective. This is why we might need still
another slogan: "Be sober with power." In other words,
abstain as much as possible from using the notion of power in
case it backfires and hits your explanations instead of the target
you are aiming to destroy. No powerful explanations without checks
and balances.
Politics of
time, politics of space
Going
back to things and speaking positively of the phantom of the public,
is this not, in the end, terribly reactionary? It depends on what
we mean by progressive. Imagine that you have the responsibility
of assembling together a set of disorderly voices, contradictory
interests and virulent claims. Then imagine you are miraculously
offered a chance, just at the time when you despair of accommodating
so many dissenting parties, to get rid of most of them. Would
you not embrace such a solution as a gift from heaven?
This
is exactly what happened when the contradictory interests of people
could be differentiated by using the following shibboleth: "Are
they progressive or reactionary? Enlightened or archaic? In the
vanguard or in the rearguard?" Dissenting voices were still
there, but most of them represented backward, obscurantist or
regressive trends. The cleansing march of progress was going to
render them passé. You could safely forget two thirds of
them and so your task of assembling them was simplified by the
same amount.
In
the remaining third, not everything had to be taken into account
either since most of the positions were soon made obsolete by
the passage of time. Among the contemporary parties to the dispute,
progressive minds had to take into consideration only those few
seen as the harbingers of the future to come. So, through the
magical ordering power of progress, politics was a cinch since
ninety percent of the contradictory passions had been spirited
away, left to linger in the limbo of irrationality. By ignoring
most of the dissenters, you could reach a solution that would
satisfy everyone, namely those who made up the liberal or revolutionary
avant-garde. In this way, the arrow of time could safely thrust
forward.
Philosophers
define time as a "series of successions" and space as
a "series of simultaneities." Undoubtedly, while we
filed away everything under the power of progress, we lived in
the time of succession. Kronos would eat away all that was archaic
and irrational in his own progeny, sparing only those predestined
for a radiant future.
But
through a twist of history that neither reformists nor revolutionaries
ever anticipated, Kronos has suddenly lost his voracious appetite. Strangely enough, we have changed time so completely
that we have shifted from the time of Time to the time of Simultaneity.
Nothing, it seems, accepts to simply reside in the past, and no
one feels intimidated any more by the adjectives "irrational,"
"backward" or "archaic." Time, the bygone
time of cataclysmic substitution, has suddenly become something
that neither the Left nor the Right seems to have been fully prepared
to encounter: a monstrous time, the time of cohabitation. Everything
has become contemporary.
The
question is no longer: "Are you going to disappear soon?
Are you the telltale sign of something new coming to replace everything
else? Is this the seventh seal of the Book of Apocalypse that
you are now breaking?" An entirely new set of questions has
now emerged: "Can
we cohabitate with you? Is there a way for all of us to survive
together while none of our contradictory claims, interests, and
passions can be eliminated?" Revolutionary time, the great
Simplificator, has been replaced by cohabitation time, the great
Complicator. In other words, space has replaced time as the main
ordering principle.
It's
fair to say that the reflexes of politicians, the passions of
militants, the customs of citizens, their ways to be indignant,
the rhetoric of their claims, the ecology of their interests,
are not the same in the time of Time and in the time of Space.
No one seems prepared to ask: What should now be simultaneously
present?
How
different, for instance, to deal with religion if you wait for
its slow disappearance in the faraway land of fairies, or if it
explodes under your very eyes as what makes people live and die
now —now and also tomorrow. What a difference it makes if
nature, instead of a huge reservoir of forces and a bottomless
repository of waste, turns suddenly into something that interrupts
any progression: something to which you cannot appeal and can't
get rid of. "Comment s'en débarrasser?" Ionesco asked during the "Glorious Thirties". It has now become the worry, the Sorge, the souci of almost everyone
in all languages. We can get rid of nothing and no one. Ecology
has probably ruined forever the time of Succession and has ushered
us into the time of Space. Yes, everything is contemporary. Progress
and succession, revolution and substitution, neither are part
of our operating system any longer.
And
yet where is the alternative OS? Who is busy writing its lines
of code? We sort of knew how to order things in time, but we have
no idea of the space in which to collect ourselves. We have yet to channel new political passions
into new habits of thought, new rhetoric, new ways of being interested,
indignant, mobilized, and pacified. Whenever we are faced with
an issue, the old habits still linger and the voice of progress
still shouts: "Don't worry, all of that will soon disappear,
they're too archaic and irrational." While the new voice
can only whisper: "You have to cohabit even with those monsters,
because don't indulge yourself in the naive belief that it will
soon fade away; space is the series of simultaneities, all of
that has to be taken into account at once."
This
does not mean that there is no progress in the end, or that no
arrow of time can be thrust forward. It means that we slowly proceed
from a very simple-minded form of cohabitation —such as
the evolutionary or revolutionary ones— to a much fuller
one, where more and more elements are taken into account. There
is progress but it goes from a mere juxtaposition to an intertwined
form of cohabitation: How many contemporary elements can you build
side by side, generating the series of simultaneity? Communism
might have been wrong not in the quest for the community, but
in the hasty way it imagined what is the Common World to be shared.
Figure
17 & 18: Doré's rats La Fontaine and Adamo's Robespierre
What is Dingpolitik?
Back
to things. Back to this fragile and provisional pandemonium: a
show, a catalogue. Demon and demos, as I said earlier, have the same etymology. If you follow
the first division, you multiply the occasions to differ and to
dissemble; if you follow the second division, you multiply the
occasions to agree, to compose, to assemble, to share. The difference
between the two is as thin as a knife. In both cases the Ding will disband —and so will this exhibit. If the
"demon of politics" has taken you over a certain pattern
will emerge: too much unity, too much disunity. But if you manage
to feel the passage of the "phantom public" through
your actions, another patter will emerge: less claims to unity,
less beliefs in disunity. The quest for composition has began
again just as in the times of Father Nicéron. This is at
least the effect we wish to produce upon visitors and readers.
So
what is Dingpolitik in the end? It is the degree of realism that is injected
when:
a-
politics is no longer limited to humans and incorporates the many
issues to which they are attached;
b-
objects become things, that is, when matters of fact give way
to their complicated entanglements and become matters of concern;
c-
assembling is no longer done under the already existing globe
or dome of some earlier tradition of building virtual parliaments;
d-
the inherent limits imposed by speech impairment, cognitive weaknesses,
and all sorts of handicaps are no longer denied but that prostheses
are accepted instead;
e-
it's no longer limited to properly speaking parliaments but extended
to the many other assemblages in search of a rightful assembly;
f-
the assembling is done under the provisional and fragile Phantom
Public, which no longer claims to be equivalent to a Body, a Leviathan
or a State;
g-
and finally Dingpolitik may become possible when politics is freed from its
obsession with the time of Succession.
Such
is the experiment that we have undertaken with this show and catalogue.
Needless to say, the authors assembled here don't have to agree
with one another, nor with this introduction! But accepting a
fragile and provisional roof to probe one another's attachment
to things? Perhaps.
If
fundamentalism is the conviction that
mediations may be by-passed without cost, then it's the ultimate
"ding-less" mode of doing politics.
In the end, one question really has
interested us: Can fundamentalism be undone?
When will the horsemen of Apocalypse
stop meddling in politics?